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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

No. CR-FE-2013-10953:
COUNT 1:
COUNT 2:
COUNT 3:
COUNT 4:
B.

18-4503 Kidnapping-Second Degree
18-1401 Burglary
18-905 (a) Assault-Aggravated ·with a Deadly Vv'eapon
19-2520 Enhancement-Use of Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony.

The Court initially appointed the Ada County Public Defender's Office to represent Mr.

Eddington. R. 9.
C.

On or about August 20, 2013, Mr. Chad Gulstrom, a private attorney, substituted in as

Mr. Eddington's counsel. Id.
D.

On or about September 19, 2013, Mr. Eddington entered not guilty pleas to all the

charges. Id.
E.

On or about October 16, 2013, Mr. Michael Bartlett (hereinafter "Trial Counsel" or "Mr.

Bartlett") substituted in as counsel for Mr. Eddington. Id.
F.

On or about October 21, 2013, a felony criminal complaint was filed against Ms. Diana

Eddington (hereinafter "Diana"), Mr. Eddington's mother, alleging she had committed the crime
of witness intimidation in violation ofl.C. 18-2604(3). Id.

J.

Mr. Bartlett then began to represent Diana, as well as Mr. Eddington, and entered an

appearance in Diana's case on November 12, 2013. R. 10.
M.

On or about December 9, 2013, the Ada County Deputy Prosecutor, Ms. Whitney

Faulkner, emailed Mr. Bartlett with a proposed plea offer to resolve Mr. Eddington's case. Id.

Q.

On December 17, 2013, Mr. Bartlett accepted the plea on Mr. Eddington's behalf. Id.

R.

Shortly thereafter, on or about December 20, 2013, Mr. Dinger, an Ada County Deputy

Prosecutor, agreed to dismiss all charges against Diana. R. 15.
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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Notably, however, Mr. Dinger refused to dismiss Diana's case until such time as Mr.
Eddington plead guilty
U.

this underlying criminal matter. Id.

On December 20, 2013 Mr. Dinger sent an email referencing the scheduling of the

continued preliminary hearing regarding Diana's case. In this email, Mr. Dinger states "We had
contemplated the 17th-the day after her son pieads guilty in district court." Id.; R.136.
V.

On January 16, 2014, a Change of Plea Hearing was held in Mr. Eddington's case. R. 10.

W.

At Diana's January 1i\ 2013 continued preliminary hearing (the day after Mr.

Eddington's change of plea hearing), Ms. Faulkner had taken over the prosecution of Diana's
case, replacing Mr. Dinger. R. 15.
X.

At that time, Ms. Faulkner changed "the deal" to dismiss Diana's charges after Mr.

Eddington plead guilty. R. 15-16.
Y.

Instead, contrary to the agreement Ms. Faulkner's colleague, Mr. Dinger, had made with

Mr. Bartlett, Ms. Faulkner then insisted that Diana's dismissal would only go into effect after
Mr. Eddington was actually sentenced. R. 16.
AA.

On March 13, 2014, Mr. Eddington was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho

Department of Correction for ten (10) years fixed, followed by twelve (12) years indeterminate, for
Kidnapping in the Second-Degree and five (5) years fixed for Aggravated Assault to run
concurrently. R. 11.
BB.

The dismissal of Diana's felony charge finally occurred on March 18th, 2014, the day

after the filing of Mr. Eddington's Judgment and Commitment pleading. R. 16.
CC.

On April 22, 2014, Mr. Greg Silvey filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court

on behalf of Mr. Eddington.

8

11, 20

Mr.

also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion on behalf of

Eddington.
EE.

On August 20, 2014, the Court denied Mr. Eddington's Rule 35 Motion. See Exhibit B.

FF.

On or about October 6, 2014, Mr. Eddington's appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was

dismissed.
GG.

On September 30, 2015, Mr. Eddington filed his Verified Petition for Post-Conviction

Relie£
HH.

On November 24, 2015, Mr. Eddington filed his Motion to Disqualify State's Handling

Attorney (Ms. Faulkner) on the basis she would be a material witness in the case.
II.

On December 7, 2015, the State filed its Answer to Mr. Eddington's Verified Petition for

Post-Conviction Relie£
JJ.

On December 10, 2015, the State filed its Objection in Opposition of Petitioner's Motion

for Disqualification of the State's Handling Attorney.
KK.

On January 8, 2016, the State filed its Motion for Summary Dismissal of the Verified

Petition for Post-Conviction Relie£
LL.

Petitioner filed its objection and Response to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on

January 20, 2016.
MM.

On June 22, 2016, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary

Dismissal as well as the Final Judgment in this matter.
NN.

On July 25, 2016, Mr. Eddington filed his Notice of Appeal.

IV.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.
The District Court erred in granting summary dismissal of Mr. Eddington's claims
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cited in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
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B.
The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Eddington the Relief He Was Seeking
Pursuant to a Summary Disposition Under I.C. § 19-4906(c).
C.
The District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on
the claims cited in Mr. Eddington's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Post-conviction proceedings are special proceedings and civil in nature. LC.R. 57(b);
Like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271,
61 P.3d 626,628 (Ct. App. 2002).
In addition, an application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an
ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). The
application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would
suffice for a complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008); Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The application
must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. LC. §
19-4903.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the Supreme Court applies the same
standard utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence
asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,
675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010). On review of dismissal of a post-conviction relief application
without an evidentiary hearing, the Court determines whether a genuine issue of material fact
S OPENING BRIEF
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exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions, together with any affidavits on file.
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho

1066

Ricca v. State,

Idaho 894, 896, 865

P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).
Notably, summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to LC.
§i9-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Id.; See also
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 330, 971 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Ct.App.1998). A dismissal of a postconviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing is only proper when there is no
genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with
any affidavits on file. Id. at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155 (emphasis added).
In other words, to withstand a motion for summary dismissal, an applicant for postconviction relief must present his supporting facts in the form of admissible and competent
evidence. Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881, 187 P.3d 1253, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). That is, an
application must be supported by written statements from witnesses who are able to give
testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or must be based upon otherwise
verifiable information. Id.; Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct. App.
1982). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact. Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439, 444 (2004); Nevarez,
145 Idaho at 881, 187 P.3d at 1256.
However, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);
Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct.App. 2008). Consequently, if a
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genuine issue

material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve

factual issues. Goodwin, 1

Idaho at

at 629.

Just as in civil summary judgment motions pursuant to LR.C.P. 56, all inferences must
be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Claims may only be summarily
dismissed if the petitioner's aHegations are cieariy disproven by the record of the criminal
proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each
essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of
law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146
Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Notably, when a trial court considers a motion for
summary dismissal, uncontroverted allegations of fact contained in a verified application for
post-conviction relief are deemed to be true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 531 P .2d 1187
(1975); See also Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, summary "dismissal" is not the only option provided pursuant to the
UPCP A. The Court has the ability to grant a defendant summary disposition in his favor, as
well. In particular, pursuant to LC. §I9-4906(c)(emphasis added):
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
Accordingly, Mr. Eddington respectfully requests that the District Court's dismissal of
his UPCPA Petition be overturned and he be granted the relief he requested in his Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. R. 55.

VI.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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A.
The District Court erred in granting summary dismissal of Mr. Eddington's claims
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cited in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
Mr. Eddington filed his Verified Motion for Post-Conviction Relief on September 30,
2015 (hereinafter "PCRM"). R. 6-219. The PCRM was sworn document consisting of fifty (50)
pages of testimony along with attached exhibits in excess of one hundred and fifty (150) pages.
R. 6 -219. Some of the exhibits were affidavits also containing sworn testimony. See R. 222228; R. 153-158; R. 159; R. 160-161; R. 162.
In this matter, Mr. Bartlett's action and/or inaction constituted ineffective assistance under
the Strickland Test. Hoffinan v. State, 277 P.3d 1050, 1058 (Ct. App. 2012). In Strickland, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a
right to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the
circumstances." Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,669 (1984).
The Strickland Test requires that a post-conviction relief case for ineffective assistance of
counsel to satisfy two prongs: (1) Mr. Eddington must show that the attorney's performance was
deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought
under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469,477,224 P.3d
536, 544 (Ct. App. 2009).
To establish a deficiency, Mr. Eddington has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168,
172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). To establish prejudice, Mr. Eddington must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. Id.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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strategic decisions

counsel

on inadequate preparation,

objectively evaluated if such decisions are

relevant law, or other shortcomings. Id. Importantly,

"certain defense strategies or decisions may be 'so ill chosen' as to render counsel's overall
representation constitutionally defective." Willis v. Newsome, 771 F.2d 1445, 1447 (11th
Cir.1985) (per curiam), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct. i273, 89 L.Ed.2d 581 (1986)
(citations omitted). See also Martin v. Rose,744 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir.1984); Adams v.
Balkcom, 688 F.2d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 1982).
In the present case, summary dismissal of Mr. Eddinton's PCRM was improper
because, if true, the sworn allegations and admissible evidence presented in Mr. Eddington's
PCRM would undoubtedly entitle Mr. Eddington to the relief he has requested. In his PCRM,
Mr. Eddington listed eight (8) different ways, collectively and/or individually, that caused him to
be deprived of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Eddington supported each of these
allegations by detailed, admissible evidence and extensive sworn testimony submitted with the
PCRM by Mr. Eddington and his witnesses. See R. 6- R. 219.
1. Mr. Eddington Was Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Because Mr. Bartlett
Entered into an Actual Conflict of Interest by Representing Diana Eddington ("Diana").
Mr. Eddington's Mother, in Related Criminal Actions Without Obtaining Written and/or
Informed Consent.
In its Memorandum Decsision and Order Granting Summary Dismissal (hereinafter
"Dismissal"), the Trial Court stated that there are no "questions of fact as to whether there was
any conflict caused by Mr. Bartlett representing Petitioner and Petitioner's mother, or whether
the dismissal of charges against Petitioner's mother was conditioned on Petitioner pleading
guilty to the charges against him." R. 340-341. This factual finding is clearly erroneous in light
of the sworn testimony and evidence present in Mr. Eddington's PCRM. R. 9-11; 14-19; 21-25.
As noted in the Court's Dismissal, the State of Idaho provided no evidence in support of its
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

the State

Mr. Eddington presented clear evidence that Mr. Bartlett had an actual and concurrent
conflict of interest in representing both Mr. Eddington and his mother, Diana Eddington in
substantiaiiy related criminal cases. R. 222-228; R. 13-R. 22. Neither Mr. Eddington nor Diana
Eddington waived their 6th Amendment right to have right to conflict-free counsel. Id.
Although an ethical violation does not, in and of itself, automatically result in a finding of
"ineffective assistance of counsel," it is instructive to review the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct to understand the definition of a "conflict of interest" in the context of legal
representation. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct set forth the definition of a conflict of
interest. Pursuant to IRCP 1.7 (emphasis added):
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the

representation of one or more clients will be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by the personal interests of the
lawyer, including family and domestic relationships.
Pursuant to Idaho law, if a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented
conflicting interests, there is a high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent
representation. Sparks v. State, 92 P.3d 542, 548, 140 Idaho 292, 298 (Idaho App. 2004). In a
nutshell, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the second prong of the Strickland test
demonstrating prejudice is presumed in such conflict of interest cases. Id.

To establish a

violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant must

OPENING BRIEF
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demonstrate that an actual conflict
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446

348

interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. See
980).

To demonstrate an "actual conflict," a defendant must first show that his counsel actively
represented conflicting interests and second, that the conflict adversely affected his counsel's
performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; Chippewa v. State, i56 Idaho 915,921,332 P.3d 827, 833
(2014). See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (Actual conflict is defined by its effect
on counsel, not by whether there is a "mere theoretical division ofloyalties").
To establish an adverse effect, the petition must: (1) identify a plausible alternative
defense strategy or tactic; (2) show that the alternative strategy or tactic was objectively
reasonable; and (3) show that defense counsel's failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked
to the actual conflict. Chippewa, 156 Idaho at 919-22, 332 P.3d at 831-34. Although not binding
authority, it is certainly instructive that in the 7th Circuit, "a defendant can establish ineffective
assistance of counsel by showing that his attorney pressured him to plead guilty because of the
attorney's conflict of interest." Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir.1995).
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it
bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to
refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial
plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible
in some cases to indentify from the record the prejudice resulting
from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even
with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be
difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the
attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a
conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions
in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible." Holloway v.
Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S., at 490 -491.
For the same reasons as cited above, it would typically be futile to attempt to determine
precisely how counsel's conduct would have been different had he not been under conflicting
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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duties. For that reason, a petitioner need
affected the adequacy

demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually

lawyer's performance. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho at 296.

Mr. Bartlett began to represent Mr. Eddington on or about October 16, 2013. R. 9.
Notably, Mr. Eddington's parents, Ronald and Diana Eddington were paying for Mr. Bartlett's
attorney's fees for Mr. Eddington and signed the retainer agreement as "guarantors." Id.
On or about October 21, 2013, just five (5) days later, a felony criminal complaint was
filed against Ms. Diana Eddington (hereinafter "Diana"), Mr. Eddington's mother, alleging she
had committed the crime of witness intimidation in violation of LC. 18-2604(3). Id. Diana's
felony charge was the result of Diana sending an email on or about September 18, 2013 to
Diana's ex-daughter-in-law, Ms. Carrie Eddington (hereinafter "Carrie"), the "victim" in Mr.
Eddington's pending case. Id. Diana's email to Carrie discussed Diana's concern for Mr.
Eddington' s current well-being, his mental health, and the future of their family as it related to
the pending criminal charges against Mr. Eddington. Id.
Diana was booked into the Ada County Jail as a result of this charge on November l,
2013. R. 10. Mr. Bartlett then offered to represent Diana and informed her that the charges
against her were unfounded. R. 1O; R. 222-228. Mr. Bartlett stated he would do "whatever he
could" to get the charges against Diana dismissed. Id. Mr. Bartlett then began to represent Diana
at that time, as well as Mr. Eddington, and entered an appearance in Diana's case on November
12, 2013. R.10. Mr. Bartlett failed to obtain informed consent (either verbally or in writing) from
either Mr. Eddington and/or his mother, despite the clear conflict of interest as a result of Mr.
Bartlett representing both parties in concurrent, related criminal cases. R. 14-15; R. 224; R. 139.
In fact, Mr. Baiilett failed to even discuss the conflict of interest at all with either Mr.
Eddington or Diana. R. 9; R. 222-228. Mr. Bartlett did, however, obtain written consent from
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Eddington's parents to access the retainer they had paid for Mr. Eddington's defense
to

for Diana's representation as well. Id.; R.

5; R.

order

R. 1

On or about December 20, 2013, less than two (2) months after she was charged, the
State of Idaho offered to entirely dismiss Diana's felony charge. However, the dismissal was not
offered free and indepenent from Mr. Eddington's case. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that
the State would only dismiss her charge if, and only if, Mr. Eddington would plead guilty and be
sentenced in his related case. R. 14-19; R. 222-228; R. 136. This "package deal" is very clear
evidence that Mr. Bartlett was actively representing actual conflicting interests without a waiver.

It is extremely notable that neither Mr. Bartlett nor the State of Idaho presented any
evidence whatsoever denying or refuting the allegations in Mr. Eddington's Petition. If Mr.
Eddington's and his witnesses' sworn statements were not true, why did the State fail to provide
affidavits or any other admissible evidence to the contrary? Nevertheless, the State provided no
evidence denying Mr. Eddington's claims-there was no affidavit provided by Mr. Bartlett, no
affidavit provided by either prosecutors on the related criminal cases or anyone else.
Mr. Bartlett prioritized Diana's case over Mr. Eddington's case as demonstrated from the

sworn evidence and testimony set forth in Mr. Eddington's PCRM. R. 15-19; R. 224-228. Mr.
Bartlett advised Diana that she could not testify on Mr. Eddington's behalf while the charge against
her was pending because it could affect her case. Id. Mr. Bartlett further refused to submit Diana's
letter of support for Mr. Eddington to the Court because he stated it could affect Diana's pending
charge. R. 16; R. 137; R. 225-226.
The State of Idaho refused to dismiss Diana's charge until AFTER Mr. Eddington was
sentenced. R. 16-19. The conflict of interest in this matter put Mr. Bartlett in t.1.e difficult
position of choosing one client over another-and he chose Diana, rather than Mr. Eddington.
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225-226. The dismissal of Diana's charge finally occurred on March 18th, 2014, the day
filing

Eddington' s

Both the State of Idaho and Mr. Bartlett was using the felony charge against Diana as
leverage during the plea negotiations and sentencing in Mr. Eddington's underlying criminal
matter.

r"ll·

Bai-t:lett knew the plea offer for JMr. Eddington was very bad indeed and even

admitted to the prosecutor that he was "a pushover" for accepting such a plea on behalf of his
client. R. 312.
Further, Mr. Bartlett informed Mr. Eddington during one of his visits that "your mom's
charges will be dropped as soon as you plead out." R. 17. He also implied that the fate of Diana's
case was up to him. Id. Neither the State nor Mr. Bartlett provided any evidence denying this
fact.
This "package" plea deal should have immediately alerted Mr. Bartlett to his ethical
duties and an obvious conflict of interest. However, Mr. Bartlett did nothing to inform either of
his clients that there was a conflict of interest in representing both of them or, more importantly,
that Mr. Eddington's defense would have to suffer because Mr. Bartlett would not let Diana
make any statements to the Court, written or otherwise, to support her son. R. 16-18; R. 222-228;
R. 137; Mr. Bartlett demonstrated his divided loyalties between Diana and Mr. Eddington by
permitting the prosecution to use the threat of pursuing a felony charge against Diana to impose
improper pressure on Mr. Eddington to plead guilty. Id.
Being pressured by Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Eddington felt obligated, out of concern for his
elderly, diabetic mother, to accept whatever plea deal the prosecution offered in order to protect
Diana. Mr. Bartlett's divided loyalties and conflict of interest interfered with his putting forth a
defense for Mr. Eddington at his sentencing in an effort to avoid jeopardizing the dismissal of
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Diana's case. R.
A further instance

divided loyalties occurred when Mr. Bartlett refused to

submit Diana's letter of support for her son to the Court, despite this letter having important
information about Mr. Eddington's life history. R. 16; R. 224-227. Mr. Bartlett chose to remove this
ietter from the Court's consideration out of concern that Diana's statements could potentially be
used against her or jeopardize the dismissal of her case. Id. Yet, Mr. Bartlett chose to ignore the
prejudicial effect created by failing to have Mr. Eddington's own mother provide supportive
information to the Court. Id. Mr. Bartlett's actions in this regard clearly adversely affected his
representation of Mr. Eddington.
Diana would have testified regarding Mr. Eddington's close relationships with his children,
the many life challenges Mr. Eddington was able to overcome, and his overall good character. R.
20; R. 222-228. She could have further discussed Mr. Eddington's career of helping people and
never being in trouble with the law. Mr. Eddington had NO criminal history. Diana would have
been an extremely strong advocate for Mr. Eddington at his sentencing and would have done so if
not for Mr. Bartlett's prohibition. Id.
Mr. Bartlett strongly pushed Mr. Eddington to take the very first plea offer made by Ms.
Faulkner, despite this offer being highly unfavorable and requiring Mr. Eddington to plead guilty
to the most serious of his charges with no sentencing recommendations. R. 23-25.
Mr. Bartlettis lack of performance in cross-examining witnesses and failure to correct inaccurate
testimony was just one more way Mr. Barlett protected his agreement with the prosecution regarding the
dismissal of Diana's case. During the course of the sentencing hearing, Mr. Bartlett objected a total of
seven (7) times. Of those objections, four (4) applied directly to the prosecution's mention of Diana
Eddington's case. R 32-44. The other objections were to minor issues, not relevant to the case (e.g.,
issues such as whether Mr. Eddington could move to MN to work as a nurse). R. 43. No doubt, an
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conflict of interest" occurs when a

Counsel
a

one

best interests to give

case.

Mr. Bartlett had an actual conflict of interest representing both Mr. Eddington and Diana
in their related criminal cases because Mr. Bartlett's representation of Diana materially limited
his '111tiPs to Mr. E'1dington. ~per.ifir.l'llly, Mr. R::irt1Ptt n~fnsP-'1 to pP-nnit Di::in::i prP-sP.nt tP.stimony

or evidence at Mr. Eddington's sentencing hearing. This is undisputed. Mr. Bartlett refused to
permit Diana, Mr. Eddington's own mother, to even provide a letter to the sentencing judge to
plead for mercy for her son. Again, this is undisputed.
Accordingly, if all Mr. Eddington's allegations supported by his sworn testimony and
evidence presented in his PCRM were true, Mr. Eddington would be entitled to relief.
Therefore, the Trial Court erred in dismissing Mr. Eddington's PCRM.
2.
Mr. Eddington Was Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Because the
Trial Court failed to inquire into Mr. Bartlett's Conflict of Interest After It Knew or
Reasonably Should Have Known Mr. Bartlett had a Conflict Representing Both Mr.
Eddington and Diana in Related Criminal Cases.
The Trial Court summarily dismissed this claim without much analysis. Rather, the Trial
Court simply stated it should have been brought on direct appeal of this matter and was now
waived. R. 336-337. However, pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (in
pertinent part):
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime
and who claims that the conviction or the sentence was in violation
of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws
of this state . . . may institute, without paying a filing fee, a
Idaho Code § 19proceeding under this act to secure relief.
4901 (a)(l ).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30
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1992). The Idaho Court of Appeals
address

of ineffective assistance

State v. Pentico stated: "Ordinarily we do not

counsel on direct appeal because the record is rarely

adequate for review of such claims." State v. Pentico, 265 P.3d 519, 151 Idaho 906 (Idaho App.
2011) citing Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 296, 92 P.3d 542, 546 (Ct.App.2004); State v. Hayes,
138 Idaho 761, 766, 69 P.3d 181, 186 (Ct.App.2003). They are more appropriateiy presented
through post-conviction relief proceedings where an evidentiary record can be developed. State v.
Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376, 859 P.2d 972, 974 (Ct.App.1993). An affirmative duty of inquiry
arises when the court "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist" State
v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221,237,335 P.3d 561,577 (2014).
As stated in Mr. Eddington's Petition and supported by factual evidence therein, both the
Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution specifically require that a defendant be
provided with effective assistance of counsel. To that end, every defendant specifically has the right
to be represented by conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 [101 S.Ct 1097,
1103-04, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230-31] [(1981)]. In fact, the right to conflict-free representation derives
from the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-68, 53 S.Ct 55, 63-64, 77 L.Ed. 158, 169-170
(1932). This right has been accorded not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237,
1240, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 300 (2002). It follows from this that assistance, which is ineffective in
preserving fairness, does not meet the constitutional mandate. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984).

In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an
affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it "knows or reasonably should know
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that a particular conflict may exist." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho

See also State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 703; State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho

278, 285 (2003);
90 P.3d 278,

285 (2003); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, 64 L.Ed.2d
333, 345-46 (1980). "A trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry, under certain circumstances,
win serve as a basis for reversing a defendant's conviction." State v. Severson, i47 Idaho at 703;
Holloway v.Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 437 (1978);
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47, 100 S.Ct. at 1717-18, 64 L.Ed.2d at 345.
Neverthelss, when a trial court fails to make a proper inquiry, but the defendant did not
object to the conflict, the defendant's conviction will only be reversed if he can prove that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his attorney's performance. State v. Severson, 147
Idaho at 703; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d at 346; see also United
States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir.1986). The defendant need not, however, show
prejudice in order to obtain relief. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 703; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 34950, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 347.
The evidence supporting this claim is contained within the Court's record in Mr.
Eddington's underlying criminal case, as well as transcripts for hearings in the matter (specified in
detail in Mr. Eddington's Petition on pages 14-17, along with the Court's file and transcripts in the
underlying criminal matter). R. 20-22.
Again, the State presented no evidence whatseover disputing Mr. Eddington's claim, but
made the unsupported and incorrect conclusory statement that the trial Court did not actually have
the duty to inquire because "there was no conflict."
conclusion.

R. 276.

This is clearly an erroneous

As described in full detail above, there can be no doubt that Mr. Bartlett had a
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significant and predjudicial conflict of interest in representing both Mr. Eddington and Diana
substantially related criminal cases.

3.
Mr. Eddington Was Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Because Mr.
Bartlett Imposed Improper Pressure and Failed to Fully Advise Mr. Eddington of the
Potential Direct Consequences of his Plea Deal.
In order for a guilty plea to be in compliance with constitutional due process standards, it
must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 432,
885 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 446, 767 P.2d 286, 289
(Ct.App.1989); Brooks v. State, 108 Idaho 855, 857, 702 P.2d 893, 895 (Ct.App.1985).
Compliance with these standards turns upon whether: (1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that
the defendant understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses, and to
avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
State v. Huffinan, 137 Idaho 866, 55 P.3d 879 (Ct. App. 2002).
"The voluntariness of a plea can be determined only be considering all of the relevant
circumstances surrounding it." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970).
Because of the unusual circumstances of this case, in particular because the plea agreement was a
"package deal," this Court believes that defendant and the state should be given an opportunity to
present evidence on both of these issues at a post conviction hearing. Mendiola v. State, CV
2004 8005; Hall v. U.S., 371 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2004).
Instead of protecting his client's rights, Mr. Bartlett pressured Mr. Eddington into
accepting a highly unfavorable plea deal with no sentencing recommendations from the
prosecution. R. 223-226. Further, as indicated previously, Mr. Bartlett's advice to Mr. Eddington
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was seriously compromised by a conflict
Eddington and Diana Eddington,

interest resulting from representing both Mr.
related cases.

On or about December 9, 2013, Ms. Faulkner, emailed Mr. Bartlett with a proposed plea
offer to resolve Mr. Eddington's case. R. 10. Ms. Faulker gave Mr. Bartlett a deadline of
December 13, 2013 to respond to the offer or it wouid be revoked. R. 10. However, Mr. Bartiett
did not even discuss the plea offer with Mr. Eddington until December 16th, 2013, three days
after Ms. Faulkner's stated deadline for accepting the plea. R. 23. The evidence shows that Mr.
Bartlett simply did not respond to Ms. Faulkner in a timely manner, prompting Ms. Faulker to
ask Mr. Bartlett ifhe was "alive." R. 85.
While attempting to convince Mr. Eddington to accept the first and only plea offer from
the prosecution at the very last minute, Mr. Bartlett alluded to Diana Eddington's charges being
dropped if Mr. Eddington pied guilty. R. 18; R. 23; R.27.

Mr. Eddington was extremely

concerned about his mother's charge being pursued as suggested by Mr. Bartlett if Mr.
Eddington did not plead guilty. Mr. Eddington felt like he had no other choice but to reluctantly
go along with Mr. Bartlett's advice. R. 25.
Further, it is reasonable to believe that a defense attorney would thoroughly investigate
his client's case before advising his client to accept an unfavorable plea. R. 23. Yet, Mr. Bartlett
strongly advised Mr. Eddington to take the plea without thoroughly investigating the case or
consulting with Mr. Eddington regarding possible defenses to the charges. Id.; R. 28; R. 44.
In particular, Mr. Bartlett did not listen to the audio police interviews with Carrie, the
victim in the case. R. 44-45. When asked about whether he had listened to all audio taped police
interviews, :Mr. Bartlett responded by saying that Mr. Eddington and his family "could not
afford" to have him do so. Id. As indicated throughout this Petition, however, the information
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obtained from these audio recordings would have been well-worth the additional expense. Id. At
no time

Eddington tell Mr. Bartlett that

could not afford for Mr. Bartlett to do a

thorough investigation of his case. Id. He would have gladly paid the additional expense so that
Mr. Bartlett would be prepared to defend Mr. Eddington at his sentencing. Id.
Mr. Eddington specifically expressed to Mr. Bartiett that he did not agree with pieading
guilty to Kidnapping in the Second-Degree. R. 24. Mr. Bartlett responded by claiming that Mr.
Eddington "was guilty" of Kidnapping and that he could show Mr. Eddington in the law how the
charges fit his actions. Id. Mr. Bartlett exhibited frustration with Mr. Eddington's questioning of
the agreement and actually informed Mr. Eddington that he would be accepting the plea. Id.
Mr. Bartlett was so highly motivated to ensure that Mr. Eddington accepted the plea, that
he neglected to advise Mr. Eddington of the full potential consequences of accepting the deal. R.
24-25. Instead, Mr. Bartlett minimized the severity of the possible penalties by informing Mr.
Eddington and Mr. Eddington's family that Ms. Faulkner's intent was to request a unified
sentence of "up to 10 years in prison." Id.; R. 225; R. 157.
Mr. Bartlett further told Mr. Eddington that the prosecutor was "way overreaching" and
that Mr. Eddington should not worry about getting that type of sentence, grossly
mischaracterizing Mr. Eddington's potential exposure.

R. 25. In fact, Mr. Bartlett told Mr.

Eddington that he "could very well get probation from this judge." Id. (A "gross
mischaracterization" of the likely outcome provides a "strong indication of constitutionally
deficient performance." Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487,495 (7th Cir. 2007)].
Mr. Bartlett also minimized the terms relating to a "no contact order" between Mr.
Eddington and his minor children for an undisclosed amount of time. R. 26.

Mr. Bartlett

dismissed Mr. Eddington's concerns by stating that he could easily have this order revised after
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completed

sentence. Id. At that time, on or about January

the night before the

once again expressed concern to Mr. Bartlett regarding the
advisability of the plea deal and questioned whether it was in his best interest to accept it Id.
Mr. Bartlett then became extremely angry with Mr. Eddington and told him that he could
go ahead and can his parents to ask them for an additionai $20,000 for his defense payabie to Mr.
Bartlett. R 26-27. Mr. Bartlett told Mr. Eddington that he "needed to take responsibility for
what he did and just sign the plea agreement." Id. Mr. Bartlett then directed Mr. Eddington to
act appropriately at the hearing and to tell the judge exactly what Mr. Bartlett told him to say. Id.
Mr. Eddington was once again surprised that defense counsel was so invested in Mr. Eddington
accepting the plea. Id.
Mr. Eddington felt trapped. R. 27. Mr. Eddington was frightened that if he did not act as
Mr. Bartlett directed, both he and his mother would end up going to trial, causing financial ruin

for his parents and risking his mother's incarceration. Id. Further, with the plea hearing scheduled
for the next day, Mr. Eddington believed that he had no option other than to acquiesce to his
attorney's demands. Id.
Had Mr. Bartlett complied with his responsibility to fully inform/explain to his client the
potential consequences of his plea (and not apply improper pressure), Mr. Eddington would have
rejected the offer to plead guilty to Kidnapping in the Second-Degree and Aggravated Assault.
Id. In light of the circumstances in this matter, it is Mr. Eddington's belief that Mr. Bartlett
convinced Mr. Eddington to accept a plea that was not in his best interest so that Ms. Faulkner
would dismiss Diana's felony charge. Id.
The Trial Court stated that Mr. Eddington cannot now say he was coerced in pleading
guilty because she asked him if he was coerced and he said "no." R. 342-343. However, not
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prosecutor but
Eddington and

Eddington's

own attorney, Mr. Bartlett, was coercing Mr.

him with his mother's imprisonment and financial

Mr.

Eddington did not plead guilty. Due to Mr. Bartlett's conflict of interest in representing both Mr.
Eddington and Mr. Eddington's mother, Mr. Bartlett was in the Courtroom pressuring Mr.
Eddington at the time of his plea. It is reasonable that Mr. Eddington would not admit to the
coercion when the very perpetrator unduly pressuring Mr. Eddington is sitting with him as his
attorney.
4.
There Are Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to Whether Mr. Eddington Was
Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Due to His Trial Counsel's Objectively
Deficient Performance at Mr. Eddington's Sentencing.
As stated above, the Strickland Test to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel
requires that two prongs be satisfied: (1) Mr. Eddington must show that his Mr. Bartlett's
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Eddington. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To establish such a deficiency, the petitioner has the
burden of showing that Mr. Bartlett's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). To
establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for Mr. Bartlett's
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
The Supreme Court has specifically said that the "prejudice prong" requires the petitioner to
show only a "reasonable probability" of a different result. The petitioner does not have to prove that
his lawyer's errors "more likely than not" alter the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 700 104 S.C. 2052, 2067, 80 L. Ed. 2D 674, 697(1984). "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Dunlap V, 155 Idaho at 383, 313
P.3d at 39 (quoting Cullen, 563 U.S. at_, 131 S.Ct. at 1403).
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Notably, strategic

tactical decisions

relief under a claim

a trial attorney

not serve as a basis for post-

ineffective assistance of counsel "unless the decision is shown to

have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings
capable of objective review." Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000) (emphasis
added). To this end, "[a) fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made
to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, " and counsel's conduct must be evaluated "from
counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
In his verified Petition, Mr. Eddington produced sworn evidence to support his claims
that Mr. Bartlett failed to provide effective assistance of counsel and prejudiced Mr. Eddington
in the following ways (other than the claims specifically discussed above): 1) by refusing to
permit favorable witnesses to testify on Mr. Eddington's behalf at the sentencing hearing or
present sufficient mitigating evidence of Mr. Eddington's longstanding mental health challenges;
2) by failing to cross-examine all but one of the State's witnesses at the sentencing hearing to
correct and/or object to irrelevant and/or inaccurate testimony at the sentencing hearing; 3) by
failing to adequately familiarize himself with the facts of the case; 4) by presenting a closing
argument at sentencing that depicted Mr. Eddington in a negative light and 5) by failing to
request a referral to place Mr. Eddington in mental health court for which he was qualified.
Collectively, Mr. Bartlett's decisions in this matter clearly and objectively result not from tactical
strategies but rather from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law and his conflict of
interest.
Each and every one of Mr. Eddington's claims were specifically detailed with supporting
evidence, along with Mr. Eddington's own sworn testimony in his verified Petition, the evidence
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contained within the underlying criminal case (including transcripts
Petition.

hearing), and sworn

6-228.

Again, the State submitted no evidence whatsoever in support of their position. The State
did not submit an affidavit from Mr. Bartlett indicating it was his "legal strategy" when he
pressured Mr. Eddington to take an unfavorabie piea deai so that Diana's case would be
dismissed after Mr. Eddington plead guilty. Mr. Bartlett did not swear under oath that it was his
"legal strategy" to not review all the evidence in the case, permit favorable witnesses to testify
on Mr. Eddington's behalf at his sentencing.
The State provided no evidence or testimony to suggest that Mr. Bartlett failed to correct
inaccurate testimony at Mr. Eddington's sentencing because it was his "legal strategy." Id.; see
also Petition pps. 28-29. In its Motion, the State further failed to articulate how Mr. Bartlett's
failure to review the police tapes in Mr. Eddington's underlying criminal matter was an
objectively reasonable "legal strategy." See sworn Petition, pps. 38-40 and Affidavits filed in
support of the Petition. Clearly, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr.
Eddington was provide with effective assistance of counsel under the circumstances.

5.
Based Upon His Conflict of Interest, Mr. Barlett Refused to Permit
Willing and Favorable Witnesses to Testify on Mr. Eddington's Behalf at the
Sentencing Hearing.
To Mr. Eddington's surprise, disappointment and dismay, Mr. Bartlett failed to call any
witnesses in support of Mr. Eddington at Mr. Eddington's sentencing hearing. R. 28-32.
Notably, at the hearing for Mr. Bartlett's change of plea on January 16, 2014, Mr. Bartlett
specifically indicated he intended to present evidence on Mr. Eddington's behalf. R. 94. Mr.
Eddington relied on Mr. Bartlett's representation to the Court and believed his counsel was fully
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preparing to present a strong argument and mitigating evidence on

Eddington' s behalf at his

sentencing hearing.
Mr. Bartlett specifically told Mr. Eddington that the prosecution planned to attack Mr.

Eddington's character at the sentencing. R. 28. Mr. Bartlett further indicated that the prosecution
saw Mr. Eddington as "public enemy number one." R. 28. There was no doubt Mr. Bartiett was
fully aware that it would be the prosecution's tactic to put on testimony and present evidence to
show Mr. Eddington in the most negative light possible. With that understanding, there can be no
objectively reasonable or logical strategy that would entail Mr. Bartlett calling NO witnesses to
testify in support of Mr. Eddington.
In light of the concerning facts Mr. Bartlett expressed about the prosecution's intentions,
Mr. Eddington and his family diligently worked on providing a list of favorable and willing

witnesses to Mr. Bartlett for mitigation evidence at Mr. Eddington's sentencing. R. 28-32; R.
147-152; R. 158; R. 225-227. Mr. Eddington and his wife, Tracy Eddington, each provided
names and contact information of favorable witnesses for Mr. Eddington to Mr. Bartlett well in
advance of his sentencing. Id.; R. 160-161.
This list of witnesses provided to Mr. Bartlett who were willing to testify on Mr.
Eddington's behalf included:
A.

Dr. Tracy Eddington, Mr. Eddington's current wife, who would have

testified as to Mr. Eddington's notable absence of manipulative, aggressive, or abusive
behavior during their marriage. Further, Dr. Eddington would have testified as to Mr.
Eddington's progressively declining mental health over the previous six months and her
insistence that he begin counseling. Dr. Eddington was also in a unique position of being
able to refute many of the inaccuracies presented by the prosecution. However, Mr.
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Bartlett declined to
a

her to testify, telling
woman who was being

Eddington that the prosecutor thought
and manipulated by her husband. 11

R. 30.
B.

Tore Beal-Gwartney, Mr. Eddington's family law attorney, who would

have testified as to Mr. Eddington's child custody issues, provided accurate information
regarding the contempt charge filed against Carrie and described Carrie's documented
parental alienation attempts.
C.

R. 30; R. 147-152.

Roxie Davidson, Mr. Eddington's first ex-wife, who would have testified

that Mr. Eddington was never violent, controlling, or abusive. R. 30.
D.

Ronald and Diana Eddington, Mr. Eddington's parents, who would have

testified about Mr. Eddington's childhood and adult history which was free from any
form of violence or legal difficulty, his alcoholism and subsequent treatment/recovery,
and their concerns regarding the gradual changes in his mental health over the previous
several months. R. 30.
E.

Kathleen Eddington, Mr. Eddington's daughter, who would have testified

that Mr. Eddington was a loving, involved father who was never violent or abusive to
anyone. R. 30.
F.

Brian Davis, Mr. Eddington's co-worker from Legacy Hospice, who

would have testified to Mr. Eddington's compassion and empathy as a hospice nurse, as
well as his general good character. R. 31.
G.

Coleen Cline, Mr. Eddington's co-worker from Legacy Hospice, who

would also have testified to Mr. Eddington's value as a co-worker, his empathy with his
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patients, and

ability to interact compassionately with

patients and their families. R.

31.
H.

Dr. Jeanine Stone, Mr. Eddington's treating physician, who would have

testified to Mr. Eddington's diagnosed mental illnesses of depression and anxiety, his
history of working with her to medicaiiy manage the symptoms of those disorders, and
his use of Ambien and Trazadone to treat his persistent insomnia. R. 31.
After being provided with this list, Mr. Bartlett did nothing to secure the testimony of any
of these witnesses for Mr. Eddington's sentencing hearing. R. 28-32. Mr. Bartlett submitted some
letters in support of Mr. Eddington, but refused to call any witnesses to testify. Id. There is no
evidence that Mr. Bartlett sent out any requests, notices or subpoenas to make certain the witnesses
he intended to call to testify on Mr. Eddington's behalf would be present at the sentencing hearing.
Id.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution presented literally hours of aggravating evidence
in the form of testimony including the victim, her family members, and the investigating officer.
Mr. Bartlett's lack of preparation and planning for Mr. Eddington's sentencing was clearly
evident when Mr. Bartlett finally told Mr. Eddington at the actual time of his sentencing that Mr.
Bartlett had decided that he was not going to call any witnesses at all. R. 28-29. It is objectively
reasonable that Mr. Bartlett should have called mitigation/character witnesses on Mr.
Eddington's behalf at his sentencing under the circumstances in this case. There is no discernible
legal strategy that would have been served by calling NO witnesses on Mr. Eddington's behalf.

Mr. Bartlett's blatant disregard for Mr. Eddington's sentence exposure and his lack of effort to
call even one favorable witness in support of Mr. Eddington caused obvious prejudice to his
client.
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Bartlett's failure to call witnesses that supported Mr. Eddington at his sentencing
resulted in the Judge listening to nearly three

hours

provably inaccurate testimony

against Mr. Eddington without any mitigating testimonial evidence. R. 32-36. Mr. Bartlett's error in
this regard was significantly prejudicial to Mr. Eddington and resulted in a longer prison sentence
than warranted.
B.
Mr. Bartlett Failed to Present Reasonable Mitigating Evidence of Mr.
Eddington's Longstanding Mental Health Challenges
Mr. Bartlett knew all about Mr. Eddington's extensive history of mental health and
substance addiction issues. However, Mr. Bartlett barely even mentioned Mr. Eddington's long
history of severe depression along with periods of suicidal ideation. R. 31-33. This was very
important mitigating evidence that should have been highlighted by Mr. Bartlett but was not. When
a client is facing over 25 years in prison, it would be objectively reasonable to call an expert witness
to discuss the client's extensive and lengthy mental health history.
An effective attorney would have been prepared to provide the Court with testimony that
assisted the Court in understanding the significance of Mr. Eddington's mental illness. However,
Mr. Bartlett failed to emphasize that Mr. Eddington was severely depressed and that his primary
motivation for his actions was to commit suicide. Id. Further, Mr. Bartlett neglected to inform
that Court that Depression is highly treatable, with a treatment success rate above 80% (National
Institute of Health). Considering Mr. Eddington's amenability to treatment, as determined by Dr.
Johnston, this information was highly relevant and should have been presented to the Court.
R. 48. There is a substantial likelihood that the Judge's sentencing decision would have been
positively influenced by a better understanding of the significance of Mr. Eddington's mental
illness, along with it's high treatment success rate. There is no reasonable "strategy" as to why Mr.
Bartlett failed in this regard.
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C.
Mr. Eddington Was Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Because
Mr. Bartlett Failing to Adequately Familiarize Himself with the Facts of the Case.

Mr. Eddington asserts that due to Mr. Bartlett's actual conflict of interest, Mr. Bartlett
chose not to properly familiar himself with the facts of the case and discovery obtained from the
prosecution. R.43-49. Aithough Mr. Bartlett did manage to charge fees to Mr. Eddington in
excess of$20,000 while only working for five (5) months to arrive at the highly unfavorable plea
agreement, Mr. Bartlett was not sufficiently prepared at the sentencing hearing. R. 44-49.
Mr. Bartlett, despite informing Mr. Eddington that he intended to do so, failed to meet
with the victim or otherwise investigate this case in a thorough manner.

Id. Although Mr.

Bartlett had access to the audios of police interviews which were much more detailed and
comprehensive than the brief written summaries, he chose not to listen to them. R. 44. When
Mr. Eddington asked Mr. Bartlett about whether he had listened to all audio taped police
interviews, Mr. Bartlett responded by saying that Mr. Eddington and his family "could not
afford" to have him do so. R. 44. As indicated throughout this brief, however, the information
obtained from these audio recordings would have been well-worth the additional expense. Id.
At no time did Mr. Eddington tell Mr. Bartlett to do less than a thorough job on
reviewing the evidence on Mr. Eddington's case. Id. It is unclear why Mr. Bartlett took it upon
himself to assume that Mr. Eddington would not have enough money to pay Mr. Bartlett for
thorough preparation and review of the evidence. Id. This is Mr. Eddington's life. He, and/or his
family would have happily paid for Mr. Bartlett's time in reviewing the evidence and being
prepared for Mr. Eddington's sentencing. R. 44-45.
Had Mr. Bartlett listened to these audios, he would have discovered statements that were
supportive of his client, yet blatantly and conspicuously excluded from the written police
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interview summaries. R.

The audio tapes of police interviews contained important and

relevant information that indicated the victim's compassionate feelings toward Mr. Eddington,
her concern for his well-being, and her understanding that Mr. Eddington's actions resulted from
a mental health crisis. R. 45-48.
During her initial interview with the poiice, Ms. Eddington asked several times "What is
going to happen to Ron?" R. 45-46. She further stated "I hope he gets help. I want him to get
help. That's what I want." Carrie also stated, "His wife is pregnant. I feel terrible. I feel bad for
her. I feel bad for him. I hope this will help him." Id. Carrie also told officers "He's a good
person." The officer told Carrie that ultimately they wanted to get him some help, "not to punish
him." Carrie then said, "I know, that's the only reason why I let my Dad call the police." Id.
Carrie further stated that Mr. Eddington was in a "dark place, a dark ugly place." Id.
Carrie made other such statements indictating that she understood Mr. Eddington's actions
resulted from a mental health crisis. Carrie told the police officer, "I tried to get him to leave the
gun here because I was worried about him leaving and killing himself." R. 45.
During Carrie's interview with Detective Dixon and the Victim/Witness Coordinator, she
continued to express a desire for Mr. Eddington to receive help. The Victim/Witness Coordinator
specifically asked Ms. Eddington what she would like to see happen to Mr. Eddington. She
responded "I just want for Ron to get better. I want him to be there for the kids. I want him to be
the dad that he was meant to be." R. 46; See also Exhibit W to Petition, time stamp 1:22:001:23: 15. As stated earlier, during her initial interview with Officer Ford, Carrie also denied that Mr.
Eddington ever physically or emotionally abused her. Further, she denied that he ever threatened her with
physical harm. Id.

Corporal Ford and Detective Dixon conveniently left the above information out of their
reports and, instead, only included information that supported the prosecution's case. R. 46-47.
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However, due to Mr. Bartlett's negligence and lack of investment in protecting his client's rights,
was unaware of these omissions. Id. Had Mr. Bartlett listened to the full interviews instead of
relying on the brief written reports, he would have known of Ms. Eddington's concern and could
have shared that with the court to clarify the victim's expectations of the court proceedings. Id.
Clearly, knowing the victim's true feelings regarding the case wouid have ailowed him to
negotiate a more favorable plea deal for his client and/or request a referral to Mental Health
Court. R. 46-47; R. 51. Further, had Mr. Bartlett fully reviewed the audio tapes, he would also
have become aware that Ms. Eddington told the police that Mr. Eddington never abused or

threatened her. R. 46. This was obviously highly important evidence that should have been
brought to the Court's attention by Mr. Bartlett.
However, as Mr. Bartlett refused to even listen to the audio tapes because it would
allegedly cost Mr. Eddington's family too much money, he was not prepared to discuss these
inconsistencies at the Sentencing Hearing. R. 44-45. Mr. Bartlett was ill prepared causing Mr.
Eddington to not be provided with effective assistance of counsel.
Similarly, Mr. Bartlett also neglected to obtain and review the 2011 custody deposition
that clearly described Mr. and Ms. Eddington's failed reconciliation attempt and Mr. Eddington's
legitimate access to Ms. Eddington's house during that time. R. 47-48.
Further, considering the significant role mental health factors played in Mr. Eddington's
actions, as well as the significant prison term he was facing, it can be reasonably surmised that
an attorney invested in his client's case would have fully prepared himself by researching his
client's mental health issues and using this information to mitigate his client's actions. Yet, a
review of Mr. Bartlett's billing invoices indicated that he did no such thing. R. 182-198.
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C.
Mr. Eddington Was Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Because
Mr. Bartlett Failed to Cross-Examine All But One of the State's witnesses at the
Sentencing Hearing and Failed to Correct and/or Object to Inaccurate Testimony
at the Sentencing Hearing.

At Mr. Eddington's sentencing hearing, Mr. Bartlett was ill-prepared for the hearing and
failed to cross-examine the State's witnesses (with the exception of Dr. Johnson), even to correct
clearly inaccurate testimony. Throughout the hearing, in a clear effort to compensate for Mr.
Eddington's lack of any criminal history, the prosecution attempted to demonstrate that Mr.
Eddington's actions on August 9th, 2013, related to a pattern of escalating violence. The reality is
that Mr. Eddington's actions were a one-time anomaly resulting directly from a mental health
crisis. R. 32-34.
Mr. Bartlett's obvious passivity and failure to cross-examine witnesses only served to
bolster the prosecution's inaccurate theory. R. 33. Had defense counsel actually investigated the
evidence in the case and been prepared for the hearing, he would have objected to the multiple
instances of inaccurate witness testimony. R. 33; R. 44-48. Mr. Bartlett should have fully refuted
the prosecutor's theory by presenting factual evidence to prove, incontrovertibly, that this pattern
of escalating violence never existed. Id. This was not a "legal strategy" on Mr. Bartlett's part.
Rather, it was simply a result of Mr. Bartlett being unprepared and his failure to familiarize
himself with the facts of the case due to his actual conflict of interest.
To support the prosecution's theory, Carrie Eddington read a long, fictitious victim
statement accusing Mr. Eddington of physically and emotionally abusing her, sending
threatening and harassing emails, being "obsessed with" and "dependent upon her", bullying her
through the courts, and driving by her house. R. 33. These accusations were provably inaccurate,
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Mr. Bartlett did not even politely cross-examine Carrie under oath to correct her
misstatements. R.
Had Mr. Bartlett been prepared to represent his client's interests, he would have presented
concrete evidence in the form of cell phone records, email records, and audio police report
interviews to dispute the victim's false claims during cross-examination. R. 33. However, and
contrary to the prosecution's theory, Carrie stated very clearly in her interview with Officer Ford
that Mr. Eddington was never physically or emotionally abusive toward her. She also indicated
that Mr. Eddington never threatened her with violence. R. 33-34.
Mr. Bartlett failed to correct this unfair characterization and to allow it to stand as fact
was a significant error on his part. Judge Norton was obviously influenced by the prosecutor's
remarks. Judge Norton stated "I am concerned for the safety of your children, and I'm concerned
for the safety of the other children as they mature into teenagers because communication issues
with teenagers are rampant." R. 39.

Judge Norton undoubtedly used this improper

characterization as partial justification for her harsh sentence, as well as justification for
including the minor children in her no contact order.
Ms. Faulkner's closing argument also referenced Carrie's false claims regarding Mr.
Eddington "calling her, texting her, e-mailing her daily" and indicated that this corroborated that
Mr. Eddington was "obsessed and dependent on the victim." R. 41. This statement, like so many
of Ms. Faulkner claims, is provably false but Mr. Bartlett did not step in to correct this falsehood.
During Carrie Eddington's initial police interview, Officer Ford asked her if Mr.
Eddington had ever been physically abusive toward her. Carrie responded by saying "no." R. 28;
See also Exibit V to Petition. Ms. Eddington also specifically denied being verbally abused or
threatened with physical harm. See Exhibit V to Petition time stamp 07:25-8:10.
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In an interview with Detective Dixon, he informed Carrie that the prosecution would be
searching Mr. Eddington's phone for threatening texts and emails. R. 34. He asked her if most of
the e-mails were about custody and whether there were any threats of violence. DeeDee Belue,
the victim's mother responded by saying that the only "threats" consisted of taking Ms.
Eddington back to court to get more time with their children. R. 34. Ms. Eddington added that
there "were no physical threats." R. 34; See also Exhibit W to Petition, time stamp 1:05:50; See
also Exhibit V to Petition, time stamp 7:25-8:10.
Mr. Eddington's phone and email records would have proven that he did not call or text
Ms. Eddington excessively. R. 34.

In fact, his phone records for the three months prior to

August 91\ 2013 indicated Mr. Eddington rarely called/texted Carrie. R. 34.

Mr. Eddington

specifically asked Mr. Bartlett to obtain a copy of these records to present as evidence but Mr. Bartlett
failed to do so. Id. Failure to obtain this vital information is just another reasonable step Mr. Bartlett
failed to do in representing Mr. Eddington. It cannot be considered a reasonable strategy to fail to present
evidence that would directly contradict aggravating testimony presented by the prosecution.
In addition, at the sentencing, during the testimony of Clarence Belue, Carrie's father, the

prosecutor walked Mr. Belue through the events of August 9, 2013 regarding his involvement.
When it came time for Mr. Bartlett to cross-examine, he simply stood up and thanked Mr. Belue
for his testimony. R. 34. Mr. Belue testified that Carrie refused to allow him to call the police
out of fear that Mr. Eddington would come back and kill her. R. 34. Again, had defense counsel
actually listened to the police tapes, he would have been aware that Carrie had stated that she
only allowed her father to call the police because she hoped it would result in Mr. Eddington

getting the help he needed. R. 34; See also Exhibit V to Petition, time stamp 13:58. This other,
more sympathetic, motivation of Carrie for calling the police was conveniently omitted from Mr.
Belue's testimony (as well as the written police reports). Mr. Bartlett's failure to cross-examine
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Mr. Belue allowed this more frightening motivation to stand as fact, thus wrongfully prejudicing
the judge against Mr. Eddington. R. 34-35.
Dr. Michael Johnston, the court-appointed neuropsychologist, testified as to Mr.
Eddington's mental health diagnoses and his risk to re-offend at the sentencing.

R. 35.

Nevertheless, despite Mr. Eddington's primary motive in his criminal actions being to commit
suicide, Mr. Bartlett did not cross examine Dr. Johnston as to Mr. Eddington's mental health
issues as they related to Mr. Eddington's actions. Id. Mr. Bartlett also neglected to ask Dr.
Johnston for confirmation that Mr. Eddington's suicidal fantasies, irrational thinking, and selfdestructive behavior are common symptoms of depressed individuals trying to cope with
overwhelming emotional pain. Id. Mr. Bartlett also failed to cross-examine Dr. Johnston
regarding the treatment success rate for depression. According to the National Institute of Health,
the success rate is over 80%. Id. This was definitely information worth sharing with the court.
More concerning, however, is that there were no questions regarding, or objections to, the
fact that Dr. Johnston was given inaccurate and incomplete evidence on which to base his riskassessment. Specifically, in Dr. Johnston's report, it references using collateral information from
police reports to supplement the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment (SARA).

Based on the

objective results of the SARA, Mr. Eddington was considered to be within the Low to Moderate
risk range of re-offending. Id.
In order to more conclusively determine Mr. Eddington's risk level, Dr. Johnston used
clinical judgment based on collateral information. R. 35-37. As indicated earlier, the written
police reports were extremely brief and included inaccurate information from the victim while
excluding any information sympathetic to the defense. R. 34-35. In his report, Dr. Johnston
stated "collateral information indicated the examinee had taken manipulative steps to gain access
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to his victim's (ex-wife) home, specifically asking his children to provide the garage door code."
This was proven inaccurate through the 2011 custody deposition. Carrie, herself, had
given Mr. Eddington the code when they were trying to reconcile. R. 36; R. 171-172. Mr.
Bartlett should have brought this fact to light-Mr. Eddington did not manipulate the children to
get the code. Id. The Court certainly considered this as significant aggravating evidence.
However, it was not true--Mr. Bartlett could prove it with Carrie's own sworn testimony, but
Mr. Bartlett chose not to.
Dr. Johnston also states on page 19 of his report "Collateral information indicated the
victim (ex-wife) described the examinee as displaying obsessive behavior, attempting to
communicate with her on a daily basis, at times multiple times per day, coupled with reportedly
becoming frustrated if the victim did not reciprocate." R. 36. This information is also provably
false by reviewing Mr. Eddington's phone and email records, but again, in spite of Mr.
Eddington's requests to Mr. Bartlett to obtain such records, Mr. Bartlett refused to do so. Id. Mr.
Bartlett did not question this statement or cross-examine Dr. Johnston on this issue. Id.
Dr. Johnston also considered a neighbor's statement that he observed Mr. Eddington drive
by the victim's house on numerous occasions. R. 36. However, Mr. Eddington had valid reasons
to be in that neighborhood that had absolutely nothing to do with "stalking" Ms. Eddington. R.
36-37. When the children were in Mr. Eddington's custody, he would pick up his daughter from
the bus stop which was located down the street from Ms. Eddington's home. Id. Mr. Eddington
had to drive by her home to pick up his daughter. Id. Also, Mr. Eddington's son attended an
elementary school which was located directly behind Ms. Eddington's house and would at times
have to drive by her house to pick him up. Id. Mr. Bartlett did nothing to explain this situation to
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the Court, and, instead let the statement go unchallenged with the suggestion that Mr. Eddington
was somehow "stalking" Carrie when he was just picking up his children. Id.
Unbeknownst to him, Dr. Johnston based his risk assessment on provably false and
incomplete collateral information. R. 3 7.

Had Mr. Bartlett provided effective assistance of

counsel by highlighting the false information, Dr. Johnston would have likely assigned Mr.
Eddington a Low risk level. Id. Mr. Bartlett's failure to object to the false testimony and provide
accurate evidence to Dr. Johnston further supports his deficiencies as counsel.
Notably, Mr. Eddington's Moderate risk to re-offend was referenced repeatedly by Judge
Norton and was obviously a significant factor in her sentencing determination. In Sentencing Tr.
(Exhibit I) at pg. 10 I, lines 8-11: Judge Norton states "When I look at a Moderate risk of reoffense I have to look at it in terms of a Moderate risk related to that level of escalation and
potential danger to the community." Had Mr. Bartlett thoroughly cross-examined Dr. Johnston or
previously corrected the inaccurate collateral information, Dr. Johnston would likely have
reached the more accurate conclusion that Mr. Eddington was a Low risk to re-offend, thus
influencing Judge Norton's sentencing decision in a manner more sympathetic to Mr. Eddington.
It is reasonable to conclude that the sentence imposed by Judge Norton would have been

different had she known the risk assessment outcome weighed heavily toward a Low risk to reoffend without the false collateral information. Mr. Bartlett's lack of corrections allowed this
falsified, inflammatory information to stand as fact and cause prejudice against his client.
Mr. Bartlett, as was his pattern throughout the sentencing hearing, failed to object to the
prosecutor's inaccurate, damaging, and unsubstantiated statements. R. 38-43. With minimal
effort, Mr. Bartlett should have presented l\1r. Eddington's phone and email records as evidence
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and eliminated the inflammatory accusation of Mr. Eddington's "obsession and dependency"
issues from the Court's consideration. R. 41.
Mr. Bartlett failed to object to or to cross-examine Detective Dixon to demonstrate the
inaccuracy of Detective Dixon's overtly inflammatory testimony. R. 41-42. Instead, he allowed
this inaccurate, prejudicial infom1ation to be used against his client both during the testimony
and again during the prosecutor's closing argument. Id. It is more than reasonably probable that
had Mr. Bartlett acted in his client's best interests and corrected provably inaccurate testimony,
Mr. Eddington would have received a more lenient sentence.
D.

Mr. Eddington Was Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Because
Mr. Bartlett Presented a Closing Argument at Sentencing that Depicted Mr.
Eddington in a Negative Light.

Mr. Bartlett's utter lack of preparation was also demonstrated during his closing

argument. Mr. Bartlett's final argument was neither well-prepared, written down, nor even wellthought out. R. 48. Mr. Bartlett simply stood up and spontaneously rambled through a meek,
tentative, and often damaging to his client, closing argument. Id. Conspicuously absent from Mr.
Bartlett's closing argument, however, was a presentation of the multiple relevant mitigating
circumstances which would have been advantageous for the judge to consider. R. 119-123.
Specifically, Mr. Eddington asserts that the following circumstances should have been
presented and emphasized: Mr. Eddington's lack of any criminal record whatsoever, the unusual
circumstances of the situation (Mr. Eddington was suffering from severe depression, suicidal
thoughts, and extreme stress), Mr. Eddington's significant remorse for his actions (Mr.
Eddington fully cooperated with police, confessed to his criminal behavior and accepted
responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty), and Mr. Eddington's addiction issues (Dr.
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Johnston diagnosed Mr. Eddington with substance abuse issues based on his excessive use of
Trazedone and Ambien, as well as his history of alcoholism). R. 48-49.
While these factors do not reduce Mr. Eddington's responsibility for his actions or have
any bearing on his admission of guilt, they do support leniency in sentencing. Id. Mr. Bartlett's
failure to be prepared and argue these factors contributed to Mr. Eddington's facing a much
harsher sentence than the facts of the case warranted. Throughout the entire sentencing hearing,
it was obvious that Mr. Bartlett, despite the significant prison sentence faced by his client, was
utterly unprepared and completely disinterested in protecting Mr. Eddington's rights. R. 49.
Assuming these undisputed allegations are true, Mr. Eddington should have received the
relief he sought in his PCRM. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing was warranted and summary
dismissal of the case was in error.

5.
Mr. Eddington Was Deprived of Effective Assistance of Counsel Because Mr.
Bartlett Failed to Request a Referral to Place Mr. Eddington in Mental Health Court for
Which He Was Qualified.

Despite the blatantly obvious mental illness component of Mr. Eddington's actions in his
underlying criminal case, defense counsel failed to request a referral to Ada County Mental
Health Court. R. 52-55. Mr. Eddington's primary motivation the night of his crime was to
commit suicide. R. 52. Prior to his crime, Mr. Eddington had suffered from chronic, severe
depression, suicidal thoughts, and alcoholism for years. Id.
Mr. Eddington completed treatment for his alcoholism through the Walker Center in
2007 and had remained sober since that time. Id. Despite working with Dr. Jeanine Stone, his

physician, to find an appropriate medication for his severe depression, insomnia, an.d intense
anxiety, Mr. Eddington's mental health continued to decline. R. 52-53. Beginning in the spring
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of 2013, Mr. Eddington tried to deal with his emotional pain of his severe depression and anxiety
repeatedly fantasizing about suicide and finally decided to take his own life.

. In this

irrational state, Mr. Eddington included his ex-wife in his suicidal fantasies. Id. Prior to this
latest, and most severe, depressive episode, Mr. Eddington had never been violent in any way,
nor did he have any sort of criminal record. Id.

According to the Idaho Mental Health Court website:
Mental Health Court participants include felons who are severely
and persistently mentally ill. Their diagnoses include bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and severe,
chronic depression, sometimes with psychosis. Not all mentally ill
felony offenders qualify for Mental Health Court. Registered sex
offenders are not eligible. Participants must reside in Ada County
and be capable of complying with program requirements.

From reviewing the Ada County Mental Health Court referral information and checklist,
Mr. Eddington would have been a strong candidate for such a referral. R. 163; R.53; R. 219. In
an email response to Tracy Eddington, (Mr. Eddington's current wife), Kelly Jennings, the Ada
County Mental Health Court Coordinator, stated: "Typically, defense attorneys request that a
judge refer someone for Mental Health Court evaluation." R. 219.
Clearly, from Ms. Jennings' statement, defense attorneys should be knowledgeable of this
option and request a referral when it is in the best interest of their client. Nevertheless, knowing
about Mr. Eddington's extensive and well-documented history of mental illness and substance
abuse, Mr. Bartlett failed to pursue this extremely appropriate option for his client. A quick
review of Mr. Bartlett's billing invoices confirmed that he never researched mental illness, its
impact on behavior, or the availability of alternative sentencing options for individual's suffering
from severe mental health issues. R. 182-198.
Not only was the Ada County Mental Health Court a viable and reasonable option in this
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case, but it would have provided Mr. Eddington the intensive mental health treatment that Mr.
Eddington so desperately needed and still needs. Clearly failing to even request such a referral
under the circumstances of this case is ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in prejudice to
Mr. Eddington. Further, had Mr. Bartlett appropriately listened to the victim's original police
statement, Mr. Bartlett would have heard her repeatedly state that she wanted Mr. Eddington to
get help.
By referring Mr. Eddington to Mental Health Court, the victim's wishes could have been
respected and the Mr. Eddington could have been held accountable for his actions while
receiving the treatment he needed. It should be noted that Mr. Eddington has now served over
three years of his sentence with exemplary behavior. R. 54. He has received no disciplinary
reports, works as a peer tutor helping other inmates earn their GEDs, and has been described by
correctional officers as respectful of authority, trustworthy, and cooperative. R. 54. He has also
been working diligently to better understand his own mental health issues and how to manage
them effectively. R. 54.
Mr. Eddington's support system, which was maligned by the prosecution during his
sentencing hearing, has remained strong and consistent. R. 54. Mr. Eddington's wife and young
daughter visit him twice weekly and his parents visit monthly. Id. There is no question that,
upon his release, Mr. Eddington will seek out and actively participate in the appropriate mental
health services for his diagnoses. With treatment, he will have the support necessary to return to
being a stable, productive member of society. Id.

B.
The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Eddington the Relief He Was Seeking
Pursuant to a Summary Disposition Under I.C. § 19-4906(c).
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Notably, summary "dismissal" is not the only option provided pursuant to the UPCP A.
Summary disposition of the case may also be granted in a defendant's favor. In particular,
pursuant to I. C. §19-4906(c)( emphasis added):
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
In this case, the State of Idaho provided no evidence whatsoever in support its position.
See Record in its entirety. In his Response Brief to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal and
because the State of Idaho produced no evidence to controvert any of Mr. Eddington's claims,
Mr. Eddington requested that the Court grant Mr. Eddington summary disposition in his favor.
R. 12. In other words, it is Mr. Eddington's position that he should have been provided the relief

he was requesting without an evidentiary hearing because the facts and evidence are clearly in
his favor.

C.
The District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on
the claims cited in Mr. Eddington's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

A post-conviction evidentiary hearing is proper when the petitioner has made a factual
showing based on admissible evidence. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306,
1308 (1986) (quoting Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct.App.1982)).
The application must be supported by written statements from competent witnesses or other
verifiable information. Id. Unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations are insufficient to entitle a
petitioner an evidentiary hearing. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 446, 757 P.2d 705, 709
(Ct.App.1988).
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As discussed above, summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's
evidence has raised no genuine issue

material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor,

would entitle the applicant to the relief requested. If such a factual issue is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281
(2010); DeRushev. State, 146 Idaho 599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (emphasis added). Id.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the arguments set forth above, as Mr. Eddington provided more than
enough unrebutted and admissible evidence in support of his claims, Mr. Eddington should be
granted summary disposition of his PCRM in his favor. Mr. Eddington should thereafter be
permitted to either participate in Mental Health Court or have his sentence vacated so that he
may have a fair sentencing.
In the alternative, the case should be remanded so that Mr. Eddington can have the
evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to pursuant to the law.
Mr. Eddington would request his attorney's fees and costs be paid because the defense
of this appeal is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 41 and LC. § 12-121. The State of Idaho provided no evidence whatsoever in support of its
position.

The State put forth no affidavits, no declarations, no verified documentation that

disputed the vast evidence provided by Mr. Eddington.

See Record in its entirety.

Mr.

Eddington clearly provided more than enough admissible evidence and non-conclusory
allegations, if true, would undoubtedly have provided Mr. Eddington the relief he sought in this
matter. Denying that Mr. Eddington an evidentiary hearing was unreasonable and contrary to the
law. The State of Idaho has acted frivolously and unreasonably in preventing Mr. Eddington to
be able to present his full case at an evidentiary hearing.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ _ day of October, 2016.
SMITH HORRAS P.A.
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